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NOTES
RIGHTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The Copyright Act Section 8 provides in part:
No copyright shall subsist in . . any work which is in the
public domain or . . . in any publication of the United States
Government, or any reprint in whole or in part thereof . .
This apparently simple clause has given rise to a host of complex legal
problems, not the least of which is the copyright protection afforded an
employee of the federal government for his literary products. The first
aspect of the problem to be considered arises in the following context. A
federal government employee or official creates a literary work which is
related to his official duties in one of three ways:
(1) The production of the literary work is a part of the official
duties of the employee or officer and is issued by the government as a
public document.2
(2) The production of the literary work is not a part of the of-
ficial duties of the officer or employee, and the subject matter of the
work is unrelated to these duties.'
(3) The literary work has some bearing on, or arises out of his
duties but its creation is not a part thereof.4 In each of these situations
it becomes imperative, because of the prohibition of Section 8, to de-
termine whether the literary product is a "publication of the United
States Government," thereby precluding the author-employee from
acquiring the exclusive right for a limited time to reproduce and dis-
tribute the work that results from securing a statutory copyright.'
The second part of the problem to be considered arises in the following
context. A literary product of the third type noted above has been pro-
1. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). 28 Stat. 608 (1895), 44 U.S.C. § 58 (1958), which
authorizes the public printer to sell duplicate stereotype or electrotype plates from which
government publications are printed also provides that, "No publication reprinted from
such stereotype or electrotype plates and no other Government publication shall be
copyrighted."
2. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D.D.C. 1959).
3. Id. at 603.
4. Id. at 604.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). "Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the
provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work...
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duced by a high-ranking government official, and its subject matter is
of current national concern. The author has made a rather wide dis-
tribution of copies of the work to the public without securing a statutory
copyright. The question is whether the work should be held to be in
the "public domain" as a result of the distribution, thus rendering applic-
able the public domain prohibition of Section 8.
POSITION OF NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
-THE WORK FOR HIRE RULE
The position of federal government personnel can, perhaps, be
brought into clearest perspective by briefly describing the rights of
persons other than officers or employees of the United States under
the Copyright Act. The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact
copyright legislation for the purpose of promoting the creation of liter-
ary works, the apparent plan being that an author will be induced to
create artistic works if the exclusive right to publish and sell the work
is vested in him for a limited time.6 Although the Constitution refers
specifically to authors with no mention of employers the Copyright Act
recognizes that a literary product may be created as a result of a master-
servant relationship, whereby the author was employed to produce the
literary work for his employer. In this situation, designated as a work
made for hire, the act provides that the employer is to be considered the
author of the work for purposes of initially securing a copyright,7 and
the copyright proprietor for purposes of renewing a subsisting copy-
right.' Thus, it has been held that where a city employed an artist to
paint murals on the walls of a school auditorium the employer acquired
the right to reproduce copies thereof in the absence of an agreement
reserving the copyright in the artist.9 The apparent reason for the
work for hire rule is that the employee did only that which he was hired
to do, and the property rights in the finished products should vest in
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . .
the Exclusive Right to their . . . Writings. .... "
7. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). ". . . the word 'author' shall include an employer in
the case of works made for hire."
8. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1958). It should be noted that when an employee copyrights
a work which properly belongs to his employer as a result of the works for hire rule,
he is deemed to hold it in trust for his employer. See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1939).
9. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., supra note 8. Accord, Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ; Tobani v. Carl Fischer, 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1938); Uproar v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1944), aff'd
81 F.2d 373 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936) ; Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F.
Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Brown v. Molle, 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Yale
University Press v. Row Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
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the employer whose financial expenditure was the proximate cause of
the creation of the artistic work.1" On the other hand, the mere fact of em-
ployment does not preclude the author-employee from securing a copy-
right on his literary work. When the employee is in the general em-
ployment of his employer, i.e., he was not specifically employed to
exercise his literary creativeness, and the literary work is no part of
his prescribed duties, the property rights therein vest in the employee,
and he may secure a copyright. Thus, if a person writes a play and
allows his employer to produce it at the employer's theater, the fact that
the author is employed as an actor and stage manager does not, in the
absence of an agreement so providing, give the employer rights in the
play."1
Difficult problems arise when the employee has vague, ill-defined
duties, and the resulting literary work relates generally thereto, but its
creation is not specifically called for by the terms of the employment
agreement. In this type of situation two competing policies come into
sharp conflict. On the one hand, it is desirable to pursue the policy
of encouraging an author to produce literary works by allowing him to
secure a copyright on his literary work. On the other hand, if the work
was produced at the employer's expense as a part of the employee's
regular duties, the right to secure a copyright should vest in the employer
because of the works for hire rule of Section 26.
The intent of the parties as to who is to have the property rights
in the finished work, with the subsequent right to secure a copyright, is
decisive.' 2 The literary property may be reserved to the author-employee,
either expressly or implicitly, by the terms of the employment agree-
ment.'3 \When the employment contract is silent as to ownership of the
literary product, and it is found that it was produced as a part of the
employee's regularly prescribed duties there is a presumption that title
was intended to be in the employer, 4 and the burden of showing a
reservation of rights in himself is on the employee." This presumption
10. See DRONE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONs, 243 (1879).
11. Boucicault v. Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977 (No. 1691) (1862); See generally BALL,
THE LAW or COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY, 479 (1944); DRONE, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 257.
12. Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); accord, Autry v.
Republic Productions, 104 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
13. Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896). See Dielman
v. White, 102 Fed. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
14. Dielman v. White, supra note 13; Storer Broadcasting Co. v. Jack the Bellboy,
107 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Mich. 1952). See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d
28 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1939).
15. Dielman v. White, supra note 14. This presumption has been criticized on the
ground that the Constitution intended to protect the rights of the actual author of the
literary work; thus the burden should be on the employer to show these rights have been
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has been held to be applicable only when the creation of the work was
a part of the regular duties of the employee, and not where it results
from a special job assignment for compensation in addition to regular
salary."8
The courts have considered several factors as relevant in finding
that the creation of the literary product was a part of the regular duties
of the employee. In the case of Brown v. Molle,7 the plaintiff was
hired to "build" and "direct" a radio program. In pursuance thereof,
he wrote a theme song, which he subsequently copyrighted. In an in-
fringement action it was held that although the composition of the song
was not specifically designated as one of the duties of the plaintiff's
employment it was created as a part of his regular duties and thereby
became the property of his employer. In reaching this conclusion the
court emphasized the fact that the employee had demanded no additional
compensation for the use of the song by his employer, thus indicating
that it was produced as a part of the employee's regular duties."8 It
has also been considered relevant that the facilities of the employer were
used by the employee in creating the finished product.19 It thus appears
that where the creation of the literary work relates to the duties of the
employee, but is not specifically encompassed by them, the court will
consider the presence of such factors to determine in whom the parties
intended the literary property to vest. In this manner the courts de-
termine which of the two conflicting policies should be effectuated in
the result of the case. It should be noted, however, that by emphasizing
one policy the other is necessarily excluded. In this situation the court
must decide how best to effectuate the purpose of the Copyright Act
by either vesting exclusive rights in the employee by virtue of his author-
ship or in the employer by virtue of his contractual rights.
PosITION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
The term "government publication" is somewhat susceptible to
diverse interpretations. It may refer to any materials released under
government auspices, or it may refer only to those publications which
contracted away. See Varmer, Works Made For Hire and on Commission, GExERAL
REVISION OF THE COPYIGHT LAW, Study No. 11 (1958).
16. See Shapiro Bernstein, Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 115 F. Supp. 754(S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although the reasoning of the court is not clear on this point, the
apparent theory is that the author acquires the status of an independent contractor
rather than that of a general employee.
17. 20 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
18. Id. at 136; cf. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 115 F. Supp.
754 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
19. See Storer Broadcasting Co. v. Jack the Bellboy, 107 F. Supp. 988 (E.D.
Mich. 1952).
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are printed at government expense whether or not they are owned by
the government. The term as used in determining whether a literary
product created by a government employee is copyrightable by him,
however, seems properly to refer only to those published works which
were produced as a part of his official duties as a government employee."0
In cases where the official duties of the government employee or
official are clearly defined the courts have treated the parties exactly
as they would in a private employment situation. If it is found that
the creation of the literary work was within the scope of the employee's
official duties, it is held to be a government publication, and thus not
subject to copyright because of the prohibition of Section 8.21
In the case of Heine v. Appleton22 the plaintiff sought employment
as an artist with Commodore Perry in his expedition to Japan. This
employment was unavailable, however, and he signed on as a master's
mate and agreed to perform whatever duties were assigned to him. In
the employment agreement it was expressly stipulated that all sketches
and drawings made by him were to belong to the government. Plain-
tiff prepared sketches which were sent with Perry's official report, and
Congress subsequently ordered them published and publicly distributed.
Plaintiff secured a copyright on some of these sketches and sought to
enjoin further publication by the defendant, who had published some
of them after the congressional publication and distribution. In refus-
ing the petition for an injunction, the court held that the sketches were
produced for the government as a part of the plaintiff's duties.22
It is thus apparent that when the creation of the literary work is
a part of the duties of the government employee the finished product is
government property and the employee is not entitled to secure a copy-
right therein. The facts of the Heine case support the further conclu-
sion that employment as an author is not necessary to render the literary
product government property, if it is expressly agreed that the govern-
ment is to have the property rights in any resulting literary product.
The converse of the situation represented by the Heine case is a
situation where the creation of the literary product is not a part of the
prescribed duties of the government employee although its subject mat-
ter may be generically related thereto. This situation is demonstrated
20. See authorities cited note 49 infra.
21. The courts have not specifically relied on the works for hire rule of § 26.
They do, however, apply a master-servant relationship test which appears to be an
exact duplication of the works for hire rule.
22. 11 Fed. Cas. 1031 (No. 6324) (1857).
23. Compare Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Dielman v. White, 102
Fed. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
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by the case of Sherrill v. Grieves.24 In that case the plaintiff was a
military instructor at Fort Leavenworth. There was no suitable text-
book for the subject matter he was teaching, and in his leisure time he
prepared materials for such a textbook. At the request of the military
authorities, the plaintiff allowed them to use a considerable portion of
the materials before he had produced them in book form. These ma-
terials were printed at government expense with notice of plaintiff's
copyright thereon and distributed to the students for use in connection
with their studies. Subsequently, the plaintiff incorporated these same
materials in a book and secured a copyright thereon. In a suit for in-
fringement the defendant contended that the materials were not subject
to copyright because they constituted a government publication. The
court held that it was not a part of the duties of the plaintiff as a pro-
fessor in a government institution of learning to reduce his lectures to
writing, the literary work was not the property of the government, and
that the lectures are the property of the instructor and copyrightable
by him.
These applications of the "within the scope of duties" test indicate
its value as a judicial tool for determining the ownership of literary
products created by government personnel, and consequently copyright-
able by the employee. The value of the test, however, would appear to
be limited to those cases where the official duties of the employee can
be determined with reasonable certainty. In situations in which the
official duties are vague the utility of the test is negligible and policy
factors must play a large part in the court's decision.
As in those cases involving the ownership of literary products of
non-government personnel, so in the cases concerned with the ownership
of the literary products of government personnel, there are two basic
policies. On the one hand, it has been recognized that,
. . . it is in the public interest for the Government to encourage
intellectual development of its officers and employees, and to
look with favor upon their making literary and scientific con-
tributions .... 2
The most effective means for effectuating this policy is to allow govern-
ment personnel to retain the property in their literary works not pro-
24. 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1929).
25. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C.
1959). The court also took judicial notice of the fact that a similar policy is followed
in private business.
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duced as a part of their official duties.26 As stated in the Sherrill case,
it would be unsound to hold,
• that by entering the employment of the Government a
person sells all his energies, physical and mental, to the Govern-
ment if they relate to any subject matter dealt with by him in
performing his duties."
United States v. First Trust Co. of St. Paul 28 is perhaps the clearest
application of the policy of encouragement. In that case it was held that
the literary property in the personal diary of Captain Clark of the Lewis
and Clark Expedition was in his executors rather than in the govern-
ment, against the contention of the latter that these notes were the writ-
ten records of a government officer in the discharge of his official duties.
The court reached this conclusion even though much of the contents of
the diary was a duplication of materials making up the official report
of the expedition which materials unquestionably were government
property.
The reasons underlying the prohibition of copyrights in government
publications embodied in Section 8, appear to be much stronger than those
which vest literary property in an employer because of his contractural
rights under the works for hire doctrine of Section 26. There are two
aspects to the reason which forbids copyrights in government publica-
tions. First, there is the feeling that if a literary product was produced
at public expense by a government employee it should be freely available
to the public, and the author should not be allowed to impede its free
circulation by securing a copyright thereon. This position has been
enunciated as follows:
If the services of any author or compiler employed by the Gov-
ernment require to be compensated, payment should be made in
money, frankly and properly appropriated for that purpose, and
the resulting book or other publication in whole and as to any
part should be always at the free use of the people .... ..
An even stronger reason for not permitting copyrights in government
publications is the necessity of wide public dissemination of the contents
of materials produced by and relating to issues and problems of national
26. See generally Drone, op. cit. supra note 10, at 259. "But the government can
have no rightful claim to the literary property in work produced by an officer independent-
ly of his official duties." Cf., 7 Dec. Comp. Gen. 221 (1927).
27. Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286, 291 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1929).
28. 251 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1958), affirming, 146 F. Supp. 652 (D. Minn. 1956).
29. S. REP. No. 1473, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900).
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interest. This policy is unquestionably a desirable one in a democracy,
much of whose success is dependent on a well informed public. This
position has been recently expressed as requiring that:
. . . such materials as the laws and government documents must
be freely available to the public and made known as widely as
possible; hence there must be no restriction on the reproduction
and dissemination of such documents."0
In pursuance of this policy of dissemination it has been held that no
copyright may subsist in the text of judicial opinions," although a
salaried court reporter may copyright headnotes, index digests, state-
ments of cases, "and in short, such portions of his compilation or author-
ship as requires the exercise of intellectual thought and skill."32 Similarly,
no copyright may subsist in statutes,3 nor in any kind of official docu-
ments ;"4 however, an original compilation from official documents may
be copyrighted. 5
In furtherance of this goal of public enlightenment, the government
frequently republishes the copyrighted work of an author, and the Copy-
right Act specifically saves the author's copyright from impairment as
a result of the government publication. 8 Since the policy of dissemina-
tion might be fully realized by publishing the copyrighted work of the
government employee, the question arises whether the government can
publish it without obtaining the author's consent. The congressional
report indicates that is was contemplated that the author's consent should
be a prerequisite to publication by the government.3 Should the govern-
30. Berger, Copyright in Government Publications, GENERAL REVISION OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW, Study No. 21 (1959).
31. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) ; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244
(1888) ; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) ; Banks Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-
operative Pub. Co., 169 Fed. 386 (2d Cir. 1909).
32. Banks Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Pub. Co., supra note 31.
33. Howell v. Miller, 91 Fed. 129 (6th Cir. 1898).
34. See DuPuy v. Post Telegram Co., 210 Fed. 883 (3rd Cir. 1914) ; cf., Eggers
v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 Fed. 373 (2d Cir. 1920) (dictum).
35. Hanson v. Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 Fed. 202 (E.D. Mo. 1887).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). "The publication or republication by the Government,
either separately or in a public document, of any material in which copyright is subsisting
shall not be taken to cause any abridgement or annulment of the copyright or to authorize
any use or appropriation of such copyright material without the consent of the copyright
proprietor."
This aspect of the Act raises some nice problems, e.g., does publication by the
government of an uncopyrighted work divest the author of his common law literary
property, thus dedicating it to the public? See generally Berger, supra note 30; Note,
Piracy In High Places-Government Publications and Copyright Law, 24 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 423 (1956).
37. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). The clause in § 8 was
included ". . . for the reason that the Government often desires to make use in its
publications of copyrighted materials, with the consent of the owner of the copyright,
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ment publish the work without the authorization of the copyright owner,
however, its soverign immunity from actions "sounding in tort" would
protect it from an action for copyright infringement.3" The immunity
of the government, however, does not extend to its agents or employees.3 9
There would seem to be many instances in which the copyright owner,
whether or not he was a government employee, would be reluctant to
consent to government publication of his work. This would seem to be
particularly true where the government edition would be in economic
competition with those of the copyright owner. Thus it may often be
impossible to obtain the consent of the copyright proprietor which ap-
pears to be necessary to permit the government to publish the literary
work." This factor should be of extreme importance to a court when
it is considering, in doubtful cases, whether ownership of a literary work
whose subject matter is of pressing national interest should vest in the
government or in the employee-author. If it is decided that the latter
has the property therein it may be impossible for the government to
secure his consent which appears to be necessary to allow it to publish
the work for purposes of public enlightenment.
DISCRETIONARY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS
The test of whether the production of the literary work was within
the scope of the duties of a government employee, as was noted earlier,
is effective and useful in situations where the extent of the official duties
are clearly ascertainable. In such cases there is little need for the court
to turn to policy considerations in order to determine in whom the liter-
ary property should vest. The difficult cases arise when the literary
product is that of a high-ranking government official whose duties are
discretionary, thus rendering it virtually impossible to determine if the
creation of the literary work was within the scope of his official duties.
The situation is further complicated when the subject matter of the
literary work is generically related to the subject matter encompassed
and it has been regarded heretofore as necessary to pass a special act every time this
was done, providing that such use by the Government should not be taken to give to
anyone the right to use the copyrighted material found in the Government publication."
(Emphasis added.)
38. See Lanman v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 260 (1892). See generally Note, Piracy
in High Places-Government Publications and Copyright Law, supra note 36 at 425.
39. This may, however, quite often be an inadequate remedy. See Towle v. Ross,
45 U.S.P.Q. 143 (1940). See generally HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 41 (1942).
40. The doctrine of fair use may mitigate somewhat the rigors of this situation.
Judge Yankwich has concisely summarized the rationale of fair use as an attempt to
".. . strike a scrupulous balance between the right of the author to the product of his
creative intellect and his imagination and the right of the public in the dissemination of
knowledge and the promotion and progress of science and useful arts ... " Yankwich,
What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REy., 203, 214 (1954).
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in the author's capacity as a government official. It is in this type of
case that the competing policies of encouraging literary contributions,
and the wide dissemination of matters of national importance appear to
exert great influence on the determination of the courts.
In some instances the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
literary work point to one result, even though the official duties of the
author are not clearly defined. Thus, in the case of Sawyer v. Crowell
Pub. Co.4 the plaintiff, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the
Interior, was in Alaska to make an official survey of facilities located
there which were under the control of the Department. While engaged
in this task, he collected materials for a map and later had a subordinate
employee prepare the map during his working hours with the use of
government supplies. The plaintiff indicated to the subordinate that
he intended to submit the map with his official report. Plaintiff then
copyrighted the map and published it, and subsequently it was published
by the government as an official document with plaintiff's notice of
copyright thereon. In a copyright infringement action against one who
had published the map without plaintiff's consent, it was held that the
map was prepared in connection with the plaintiff's official duties and
any rights he acquired therein as a result of copyrighting were held in
trust for the government. This result appears to be sound, and it is an
example of the policy of giving to the public the unrestricted use of those
literary works produced at government expense by an employee as a
part of his official duties.2
In the most recent case arising in this context the official duties
of the author were not clearly defined, and the facts of the case were
not such as to point clearly to one result. In Public Affairs Associates,
Inc. v. Rickover4 3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the District Court's44 ruling that the literary products involved
were the property of the government official who wrote them. It re-
versed the lower court's holding, however, that the official had not
41. 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
42. The Sawyer case has been criticized and distinguished from the Sherrill case,
where it was held that the military instructor had the literary property in his textbook.
See Note, Copyright Protection for Writers Employed by the Federal Government, 1960
WVAsH. U.L.Q. 182, 190. The writer points out that in the Sawyer case the court
held that the literary product was produced in connection with the employee's duties,
and then suggests that literary property should vest in the government only when the
work was produced as a part of the employee's duties as the court held in the Sherrill
case. This, however, seems to be only a verbal distinction illogically divorced from the
facts of the two cases. The facts in the Sawyer case clearly indicate that the production
of the map was within the scope of the employee's duties, and it seems immaterial whether
the court characterizes its creation as being in connection with or as a part of those duties.
43. 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
44. 177 F. Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959).
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dedicated this property to the public. The defendant, Vice-Admiral
Hyman Rickover, while on active duty with the Navy Department and
the Atomic Energy Commission in the years between 1955 and 1959,
delivered a number of public speeches dealing with two general areas,
education and nuclear energy." The speeches were written by Admiral
Rickover after "normal" working hours, the final copy was typed by his
secretary, and copies were made on government duplicating machines.
They were delivered during "off duty" hours near points where his
duties of inspection and supervision carried him. The plaintiff, a private
publishing corporation, sought a declaratory judgment that the speeches
were government publications thus permitting it to reproduce them; or,
in the alternative, that Admiral Rickover had dedicated his literary pro-
perty therein to the public. The court held that none of the speeches
were government publications, reasoning as follows:
It cannot be properly said, as appellant asserted, that a govern-
ment official who speaks or writes of matters with which he is
concerned as an official is by the very fact of being such an
official barred from copyright on his productions."
This decision is a clear cut application of the policy of government en-
couragement of intellectual development and literary contributions by its
personnel. In the course of its opinion the District Court stated:
It is not in the public interest to hamper the intellectual growth
of anyone, or to interfere with the development of ideas, merely
because the person who is uttering them happens to be employed
by the Government . . . no one sells or mortgages all the pro-
ducts of his brain to his employer by the mere fact of employ-
ment.'-
The fact that government facilities and government personnel were used,
to a limited extent, in the production of the speeches was not deemed to
have transformed them into government publications. The court stated
that if this was considered an undesirable practice it could be rectified
45. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals attached any significance
to the dates during which the speeches were made. It might, however, be of some
significance that they were produced during the era when the arms race was nearing
its peak. On Oct. 4, 1957 Russia launched Sputnik I. The result was that the state
of our educational programs, particularly in the field of science, and the progress of
our missile program became topics of national concern. The fact that the speeches were
delivered during this era, plus the fact that their subject matter dealt exclusively with
education and atomic energy, might have been construed as indicating that Admiral
Rickover felt obliged to impart this knowledge to the public as a part of his official duties.
46. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
47. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959).
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by departmental discipline, but that it would be unduly harsh to hold
that these facts were sufficient to vest ownership of the finished product
in the government.4" These are the same factors, however, that the
courts have deemed important as an indication that ownership was in-
tended to be in the employer in private employment cases. This fact
adds credence to the conclusion that policy factors are more determina-
tive in cases involving government employees than in those concerning
non-government employees.4"
It would seem that by emphasizing the policy that works produced
by government employees should be freely available to the public, rather
than the policy of encouragement, it could be reasonably argued that
the preparation and delivery of the speeches were a part of the official
duties of Admiral Rickover, and the literary property should vest in the
government.
The Supreme Court has recently recognized in a non-copyright
case that public statements on matters of wide public interest and con-
cern, made by high-ranking government officials may well be considered
within the scope of their duties; and the fact that the official was not
required by law or by direction of his superiors to make these statements
should not be considered of controlling significance.5" In light of this
48. Ibid.
49. See text, supra at note 19. The Rickover court also stated that the term
"government publication" in § 8 should be interpreted to refer only to those publications
commissioned or printed at the cost and direction of the United States. It should be
noted that in the Sherrill case the fact that the original publication was first printed
by the government was considered of no significance, but in other cases this fact was
an important element in the court's decision. See Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co., 142 F.2d
497 (2d 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944). This apparent anomaly has been
explained thus, ". . . a work is not a 'Government publication' for purposes of copy-
right by mere virtue of its printing and publication by the Government; that a work
produced privately (including one produced by a Government employee on his own time
outside the scope of his employment) is not a 'Government publication', even though
printed and published by the Government; that a work produced for the Government
by its employee within the scope of his employment belongs to the Government even
though first printed and published privately. In short 'Government publication' refers
to a published work produced by the Government, and perhaps to one owned by it, not to,
the mere act of printing and publishing by the Government." Berger, slupra note 30;
cf., 7 Dec. Comp. Gen. 221 (1927).
50. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959), the Court in speaking of the
privilege of executive officials from suits for defamation for statements made while
acting within the scope of their duty said, "It would be an unduly restrictive view of
the scope of the duties of a policy making executive official to hold that a public state-
ment of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and concern is not
action in the line of duty. That petitioner was not required by law or by direction of
his superiors to speak out cannot be controlling in the case of an official of policy-making
rank, for the same considerations which underline the recognition of the privilege as to
acts done in connection with a mandatory duty apply with equal force to discretionary
acts at those levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the sound
exercise of discretionary authority."
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statement it could have been reasoned in the Rickover case that because
of the time when these speeches were made, and because of the close
relationship between their subject matter and Admiral Rickover's posi-
tion, their preparation and delivery were a part of his official duties.
In addition, it has become standard practice in high government circles
for officials to promote public knowledge of current issues of national
concern by means of news releases and public speeches, particularly
through the facilities of the mass media.51
Of direct bearing on cases like Rickover is a recent statement by
President Kennedy. The President indicated that in the future he in-
tends to bar officials of his administration from making speeches or
writing articles for pay unless they turn this money over to charity.
Press Secretary Salinger summarized the reasons for this position, stat-
ing that ". . . people should not be allowed to make money on the basis
of information or experience they received as Government officials".52
This pronouncement would seem to add weight to the proposition that
it is the intent of the present administration that the preparation and
rendition of such speeches are within the scope of the duties of high-
ranking officials." The totality of these factors could be urged as a
basis for holding that the speeches were a part of Admiral Rickover's
official duties, thus rendering them "government publications," and pre-
cluding the author from obtaining a copyright thereon. It must be
emphasized, however, that the adoption of this approach would by ne-
cessity operate to the complete exclusion of the competing policy of en-
couragement of intellectual development and the creation of literary
works by government personnel.
It seems clear that the use of the "created within the scope of 'duties'"
rule is of little value in cases involving the literary works of high-ranking
officials with highly discretionary duties, absent facts clearly indicating
one result. In such cases policy considerations appear to be the determ-
ining factor in the decisions of the courts. It is self-evident that there
are beneficial aspects in each policy. The Rickover case by emphasizing
51. Perhaps the clearest example of this philosophy is that with the advent of
President Kennedy's Administration the controversy is no longer concerned with whether
there will be Presidential news conferences, as was the case during the Wilson Admini-
stration, but, rather, whether these news conferences will be shown on "live" television.
52. The Wall Street Journal, Mar 7, 1961, p. 1, col. 3 (Midwest Edition). When
honoraris was offered to Admiral Rickover he directed that it be paid directly to
charities specified by him. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 266
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
53. In the Rickover case the government did not appear as amicus curiae, possibly
indicating that it, too, believed the speeches were the property of Admiral Rickover. It
must be pointed out, however, that this case was decided before the new policy of
President Kennedy discussed in the text was announced.
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the desirability of allowing an author the fruits of his labor thereby may
exclude the beneficial aspects that accrue from a wide circulation of the
literary work. A result contrary to that reached in the Rickover case
would likewise realize the benefits of only one policy to the exclusion
of the other. Consequently, the question arises whether the two compet-
ing policies need be mutually exclusive, i.e., is there not an alternative
method whereby they can be brought into a defensible juxtaposition with
a resulting realization of the maximum benefits of each?
In cases involving the literary works of government personnel whose
duties are highly discretionary, where the subject-matter of the literary
works is of great national interest and concern, it would seem desirable
to realize as much of the benefits of each policy as possible. That is,
the author of the work should be able to retain his literary property and
secure a copyright, and at the same time give its public interest contents
the widest possible public dissemination.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
"Shop-right" Rule Applied to Copyrights. One plausible solution
to the problem presented would be to incorporate a modified version of
the patent law "shop-right rule" into the copyright area. The patent
law differs significantly from copyright law in that the government is
not precluded from securing a patent on its inventions. 4 Under the
cases concerning the patent rights of government employees, it is well
settled that when the employee is engaged to invent a prescribed thing
or to generally exercise his inventive abilities for his government-employer
he cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was
employed, assert title thereto against his employer." When the employee
is only in the general employment of his employer, however, and:
. during his hours of employment; working with his
master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his
master a non-exclusive right to practice the invention."0
That is, the patent right of the employee prohibits the unauthorized use
of his invention by all persons except his employer. The employer is
54. 35 U.S.C. § 266 (1958). The fact that the government may secure a patent
on its inventions but not a copyright on its literary works emphasizes the strength
of the policies underlying the letter. There does not seem to be a corresponding necessity
for free public access to government inventions as there is to government literary works.
55. See Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
56. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933).
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given an irrevocable license to use the invention by virtue of the fact
that his expenditures were a partial cause of its creation.
The incorporation of a version of the "shop-right" rule as a solu-
tion for cases of the Rickover type would allow the maximum benefits
to be realized from encouraging government employees to exercise their
literary abilities, and from a wide dissemination of the news value of
the work. The "shop-right" rule would permit the author-employee to
copyright his work, thus securing for himself the economic value of the
exclusive rights afforded by copyright protection. The general public,
particularly ambitious publishers," would not be able to publish the
work without the author's consent. The government, in pursuance of
its policy of public enlightenment, would retain the right to print and
publicly distribute the finished product by virtue of its irrevocable license,
whether or not the author or employee gave his consent.5" The notice
of the employee's copyright should be affixed to the copies distributed
by the government to insure him the protection afforded by the savings
clause of Section 8. "  It should be noted that this solution requires a
modification of the traditional theory of government publications. If
the "copyright shop-right rule" is made applicable to cases of the Rick-
over type, the public would no longer be able to reproduce the work
without the author's consent. However, its value as news would be
available to them as a result of the government's right to publish it.
Relaxing the Rules of General Publication. In addition to determin-
ing whether the government or its employee should acquire property
rights in a literary work, the courts may be confronted with the prob-
lem of whether the author has divested himself of his literary property
and thereby placed the work in the public domain. If it is found that
the work is in the public domain, Section 8 prohibits the securing of a
copyright on it."°
In the Rickover case, in connection with the oral delivery of the
speeches, Admiral Rickover distributed copies thereof to individuals who
requested them, to persons whom he believed would be interested in the
subject-matter, to the sponsors of the speeches to be made available to
the audiences, and to the press. The Court of Appeals held that these
57. It will be recalled that in the Rickover case the plaintiff was a private
publisher asserting that he could freely publish Admiral Rickover's speeches because
they were government publications. It is arguable that when the controversy is between
one who in no way contributed to thq creation of the work and the author, the author
should be favored. See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion).
58. See text accompanying note 40 .supra.
59. See statute cited note 36 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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acts constituted a general publication of the speeches without securing
statutory protection, thus divesting Admiral Rickover of his common
law literary property and dedicating the speeches to the public." This
holding furthered the desired end of a wide public dissemination of the
literary work, however, the result also completely subjugated the policy
of encouragement of literary productiveness by government employees.
The Rickover case unquestionably is in accord with the general
rules pertaining to forfeiture of an author's property rights in his liter-
ary products as a result of a general publication. 2 It is well settled that:
The owner of the common law copyright has a perpetual right
of property and the exclusive right of general first publication,
and may, prior thereto, enjoy the benefits of a restricted publi-
cation without forfeiture of the right of general publication."
To acquire statutory protection a literary work must be published with
notice of copyright thereon," and such statutory copyright will operate
to divest an author of his common law literary property so that he must
thereafter rely on his statutory rights,6" i.e., a common law copyright
and a statutory copyright cannot co-exist in a literary work. As indicated
earlier, when an author permits publication of his work without securing
statutory protection, his common law property rights are forfeited and
the work is dedicated to the public, who may thereafter reproduce it
without the author's consent.66  If the author makes only a "limited
publication" of the work, however, he retains his literary property and
may thereafter secure a statutory copyright.67 The most definitive state-
ment of what constitutes a "limited publication" is found in White v.
Kimmell:68
. a limited publication which communicates the contents
of a manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a limited
61. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
62. See generally Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works, GENERAL REVISION
OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW, Study No. 7 (1958); Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56
CoLum. L. REv. 185 (1956) ; Walden, Common Law Rights in Literary Property, 37
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 642 (1955).
63. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1906). Cf., Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 84 (1899); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 556 (D.
Mass. 1928) ; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (No. 1076) (1849). 17 U.S.C. § 2
(1958) preserves the author's common law right of first publication.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
65. Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Bobbs-Merrill
v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15 (2d Cir. 1906) ; Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly
Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958), in addition allows an author to secure statutory protec-
tion for his literary works which are not to be reproduced for sale.
68. 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
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purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, dis-
tribution or sale, is considered a 'limited publication' which
does not result in loss of the author's common law right to
his manuscript; but the circulation must be restricted both as
to persons and purpose . . . .
The facts of the Rickover case, at first glance, certainly appear to
constitute a general publication of the speeches, thus divesting the author
of his literary property thereby precluding him from securing a copy-
right. There are two factors in the Rickover case, however, which
could have been relied on to hold that the publication of the speeches was
not one which necessarily constituted a divestiture of the author's literary
property. The first factor is that, for all appearances, Admiral Rick-
over distributed the copies of the speeches for the purpose of public
enlightenment and not for commercial self-interests. The second is
that since the contents of the speeches were of current national concern
and were delivered by a well known government officer, the speeches
were of current news value which could be realized only by prompt public
presentation."0 Consequently, it is arguable that the distribution could
have been found to give the public only the current news element of
the speeches, but the author retained his literary property.'
69. Id. at 746. It has been frequently stated that the publication necessary to divest
one of his common law rights and that necessary for investiture of statutory rights are
not the same. Generally speaking, the former is more difficult to prove than is the
latter. See Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir 1957) ; American
Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1956); Werckmeister v. American
Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904); DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYIGHT
LAW, 32 (1925).
70. The problem of divestiture of literary property could be avoided if the author
secured a copyright on his literary product. The procedure for obtaining a copyright is
not a cumbersome one, nor would it delay the dissemination of the news aspect of the
literary work. See 17 U.S.C. §§§ 10, 13, 14 (1958). Thus the cautious government
official would be well-advised to secure a copyright on all his literary works even
though their creation might be a part of his duties. Perhaps it is rather utopian, however,
to expect these authors to pursue this precautionary procedure. Due to the paucity of
litigation there are few well established rules whereby a government author can
determine if he is entitled to secure a copyright. More persuasive is the fact that these
literary products are often initially produced as a public service with no intention of
later reproducing and distributing the work for its literary merit. When the author
subsequently decides to profit from his literary work by acquiring the exclusive right
to reproduce and sell it for a limited time, it seems inequitable to deny him this right
in favor of an ambitious publisher who contributed nothing to the creation of the work,
merely because the author had previously distributed it to the public when its subject
matter was of grave national importance. This identical problem may face an author
who is a national figure but in no way connected with the government. It is certainly
arguable that if government authors are to be afforded special treatment, so too should
private authors who are similarly situated.
71. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (1960) (dissent-
ing opinion).
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The cases dealing with divestiture of an author's common law liter.
ary property as a result of a general publication almost without exception
rely, at least superficially, on the dual test set out in the White case, i.e.,
the publication must be limited both as to persons and to purpose in order
to be considered a "limited publication." It seems significant, however,
that in the great majority of the cases which have held the publication to
have been a general rather than a limited one, the apparent motive of the
author for distributing the work was some commercial self-interest. This
was true even though the number of copies distributed ranged from as
few as 100 to as many as 10,000.2 On the other hand, when the motive
of the author for distributing the work was not commercial self-interest,
the courts have consistently held that the publication was a limited one,
and little significance was attached to the number of persons who had
access to the work.' Therefore, it might reasonably be implied that the
courts attach greater weight to the motive of the author in distributing
the work than they do to any expressed or implied limitations he may
have placed on who may avail themselves of the work, or on the purpose
for which they may use it. In addition, the intention of the proprietor
of the literary work when he distributed it is often said to be of con-
trolling significance. Thus it was stated in Aronson v. Blake :
. . . and when his act of dedication is of such a character as to
show unmistakably that he does not intend to abandon all right,
but simply to give the public the right to have a limited use of
his property, or to use it in a particular way, and to reserve to
himself whatever is not plainly given, the public acquire the
right to use his property to the extent of his dedication, but
nothing more, and to use of it in excess of the extent dedicated
is in violation of his reserved right. 5
72. See, e.g., Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S.
84 (1899) ; Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958) ; White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Egner v. E. C.
Schirmer Music Co., 48 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass. 1948) ; D'Ole v. Kansas City Star Co.,
94 Fed. 840 (W.D. Mo. 1899); Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896);
Gottsberger v. Aldine Book Pub. Co., 33 Fed. 381 (C.C.D. Mass. 1887); Jewelers'
Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
Contra, M'Dearmott Commission Co. v. Board of Trade, 146 Fed. 961 (8th Cir. 1906);
Allen v. Walt Disney Prod., 41 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); McCarthy & Fischer,
Inc. v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
73. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907);
Patterson v. Century Productions, 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655
(1937); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904);
Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (No. 1076) (1849).
74. 43 N.J.E. 365, 12 Atl. 177 (1888).
75. Id. at 180. See American Tobacco Co, v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907) ;
M'Dearmott Commission Co. v. Board of Trade, 146 Fed. 961 (8th Cir. 1906);
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It is well settled, and of considerable relevance in the type of case
under discussion, that the news element of a literary work, i.e., the de-
scription or information pertaining to events of current interest con-
tained therein, cannot be the subject of a copyright because it is not the
creation of the writer, but is only a report of matters that are publici juris.
Insofar as an article contains authorship, literary quality, and style, how-
ever, it may be the subject of copyright."
In the Rickover case the court could have held that these factors
rendered the distribution made by Admiral Rickover a "limited publica-
tion," thereby allowing him to retain his literary property in the speeches.
The court might have reasoned as follows: (1) when it appears that the
motive of the author in distributing his literary work was not for com-
mercial self-interest, e.g., to promote public knowledge of matters of cur-
rent national concern, as opposed to a distribution in order to promote the
sale of the literary work; (2) when it appears that the author only in-
tended to give the news value of his work to the public by distributing it
solely to the news media and the interested public; (3) and when the
subject matter of the literary work and its presentation by a high-ranking
government official are events of current national concern; the distri-
bution is a "limited publication." The news value of the literary work
would have been dedicated to the public but the author would have re-
tained his literary property in the work after its value as news had
terminated.
This approach would permit the public to benefit from a wide dis-
semination of the current news element of the work, and, at the same
time, permit the government official to retain the right to copyright the
work, thus providing the desired inducement to stimulate further in-
tellectual endeavors and literary productiveness. Desirable aspects of the
competing policies of encouragement and dissemination could thus be
realized in a manner similar to the adoption of the "shop-right" rule. The
government would not, however, retain an irrevocable license to repro-
duce the literary work as under the "shop-right" rule, but this seems im-
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904). In this
context it is generally held that a public performance of an artistic composition does not
constitute a dedication of the work to the public. See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S.
424 (1912); Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); McCarthy
& Fischer, Inc., v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). In the Rickover case, however,
the court partially based its holding that the speeches had been dedicated to the public
on the fact of performance. See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d
262, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1960): "Certainly when all of Rickover's acts of distribution are
considered together-performance, distribution to the press . . . these acts . . . con-
stitute publication of the speeches and dedication to the public." (Emphasis added).
76. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
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material in that the desired wide public circulation of the news element
of the work would have been accomplished as a result of the author's
initial distribution.
CONCLUSION
The works for hire rule, as it has been applied in the area of "gov-
ernment publications," is a valuable tool for allocating ownership of liter-
ary products between the employee and the government in cases where
the duties of the employee are readily ascertainable. In cases where the
duties of the employee are highly discretionary, however, the rule loses
most of its utility, and underlying policies appear to be the determinative
factors in the decisions of the courts. Where this is the case it might be
better if the courts would adopt an approach whereby the maximum bene-
fits of both policies-encouragement and wide dissemination-could be
realized. A copyright version of the patent "shop-right" rule could pro-
duce this result. Alternatively, when it is determined primarily on policy
considerations that ownership should vest in a high government official,
it could be held that his literary property is not divested by distribution
to the public, when the subject matter of the work is of current news
value, and it does not appear that the distribution was motivated by eco-
nomic self-interests.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND QUALIFIED
PENSION PLANS
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits an employer to estab-
lish a pension plan for the benefit of his employees' and provides signifi-
cant tax benefits under a qualified plan. Pension plan benefits under the
Code are dependent upon the existence of an employer-employee relation-
ship,2 however, excluding self-employed persons from qualification. The
inequity under the Code is made especially apparent in the case of profes-
sional practitioners, who are self-employed not solely by choice but also
by the laws of most states. A person cannot, of course, be an employee
of himself or of a partnership in which he is a partner, and in most states
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-404.
2. A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section .
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). (emphasis added.)
